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With PESCO Brought to Life, Will European 
Defence Live Happily Ever After? 
Jo Coelmont 
 
In 2003 already, the draft constitutional 
treaty elaborated by the European 
Convention included several articles that 
amounted to a move from an entirely 
intergovernmental European Security 
and Defence Policy to a Common 
Security and Defence Policy. These 
articles found their way, unchanged, into 
the Lisbon Treaty. But, they have hardly 
been used, including the clauses on 
Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO). 
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The point is now not to become 
overenthusiastic and to act very cautiously. For 
even in a fairy tale, miracles happen only once. 
The most important sentence of every fairy 
tale is the final one: and they lived happily ever 
after. How can we ensure that once awoken, 
PESCO this time around will remain alive? 
Does the political ambition to fully exploit its 
potential exist? If not, it will be a lost 
opportunity, and we may not be able to try 
again for many years, or ever.  
 
PART AND PARCEL OF A GENUINE EU 
PROCESS?    
In the EU process matters. It‟s even a conditio 
sine qua non to achieve success.  
Is there a political process today aiming at 
more union in European defence?   
 
A first step was taken in the autumn of 2012 
by the then President of the European Council 
Herman Van Rompuy. Having attended first a 
NAVO Summit in Chicago – hometown of 
then US President Barack Obama – and 
subsequently a G 8 meeting, Van Rompuy 
noticed that  at this level  the impact of the 
participating EU member states  and of the 
Union as such was rather suboptimal. Not just 
on defence, but also on issues of geopolitics 
and even of geo-economics. 
  
Apparently something was missing. He then 
decided to put defence regularly on the agenda 
of the European Council, i.e. at the level of 
Heads of State and Government. Henceforth 
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SLEEPING BEAUTY  
An attempt was made to activate PESCO, in 
2010, under Belgian Presidency, but there was 
no political appetite for it. “Pooling and 
sharing” was feasible, but that soon turned out 
to be nothing but another buzzword, another 
euphemism for muddling through. The result 
was predictable: a further shrinking of military 
capabilities.  
 
At the time, many experts on CSDP declared 
PESCO to be dead and buried. Some however 
– those who, like Churchill, are well aware that 
“success consists of going from failure to 
failure without loss of enthusiasm” – 
persistently kept publishing policy papers 
about it. And now a first success has been 
achieved: the European Council has decided to 
awaken the sleeping beauty.  
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it was no longer strictly about the “hailed” 
bottom-up approach. Some top-down steering 
was to be injected as well. This introduced 
nothing less than a new mind-set into the 
Union. Defence was now to be considered a 
collective responsibility. At the European 
Council meeting of December 2013 a new EU 
process was launched.   
 
The second step was taken one year ago, mid 
2016, with the publication of the EU Global 
Strategy.  Contrary to the 2003 European Security 
Strategy, this is a call for action above all:  a call 
for permanent and structured cooperation 
between Member States and the Union as 
such, for an implementation plan, and for 
regular reviews.  
 
A clear military level of ambition is the only 
element that is lacking in the Global Strategy to 
turn it into a genuine strategy.  Thus the 
Global Strategy should also be read as a call is 
to collectively identify the military level of 
ambition that is to underpin the political level 
of ambition that the strategy expresses.  
 
With all these calls for action stemming from 
the Global Strategy, we are witnessing the start 
of a permanent EU process, at so many levels.  
 
A third remarkable step  was taken last month, 
on 7 June, by the Commission, which 
proposed a European Defence Fund with 
links to PESCO, to the European Investment 
Bank and even to a series of other EU policies, 
including the Stability and Growth Pact.  
Over time this initiative may well reveal to be 
the long-awaited practical game-changer.   
Indeed, from a military, industrial, financial 
and even from a political perspective, the 
direct benefits for Member States in taking 
part in PESCO and CARD (the Coordinated 
Annual Review on Defence) are all too 
obvious. For big and small countries alike.  
Once again this is nothing less than a new 
mind-set bridging Justus Lipsius and 
Berlaymont. Times are a-changing.    
 
And last but not least, we have the recent 
European Council decisions on defence. 
PESCO is to be launched by October. A 
process is definitely ongoing.  
 A NEW STATE OF PLAY  
Moreover the current state of play of 
European Defence is crystal-clear. We are now 
dealing with 5 new realities. (1) All the 
perceived taboos or fabricated excuses put 
forward not to launch a credible European 
Defence are gone with the wind. (2) We have a 
tick in the box on treaties, strategy, process, 
instruments, agencies, incentives – you name it. 
(3) On working together with NATO “to the 
extent possible” we have a tick in the box as 
well:  it is an ongoing process. (4) For Member 
States that in the past were hiding behind a UK 
position (or opposition), that is no longer an 
option. (5)  A Franco-German axis in defence 
is in the making. 
 
We are witnessing a genuine movement, 
embedded within the Union and supported by 
most if not all Member States. It is in line with 
the new geostrategic era that we just entered 
and with what public opinion is expecting 
from the EU.  
 
Political leadership is and will remain crucial 
throughout this process.  There are clear signs 
of strong leadership within the Commission 
and the Council. As to the launch of “a 
PESCO fit for purpose”, the Franco-German 
axis in defence may well prove to be decisive.  
 
STILL A HALLUCINATION?  
All preconditions to reach the political 
objectives may be present, yet success is still 
very far from being guaranteed. The military is 
known to be but a catalyst, but at times an 
indispensable catalyst to achieve the desired 
political outcome. A security strategy without 
military capabilities is nothing but a 
hallucination therefore. In other words, it is 
now about generating capabilities. On this the 
ball is meanly in the camp of the Member 
States and by extension in the hands all of our 
European citizens, you and me.  
 
THE “ TO-DO LIST” OF THE 27  
 
Three actions ought to be taken rather 
urgently.  
 
First, to collectively identify the quantitative 
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and qualitative military level of ambition that is 
consistent with our declared political level of 
ambition. Some of our capitals advocate 
sticking to the existing Headline Goal. In all 
honesty, that would amount to preparing for 
the past. Looking to the future, perhaps even 
the immediate future, we ought to be able to 
handle a Libya scenario or a Sahel scenario. 
This would probably require the current 
Headline Goal times 2.  That is an ambition 
more in line with the EUGS. It is also a 
reasonable challenge for Europe.  For Europe 
has more citizens than the US and Russia 
together and boasts an impressive GDP. 
Against this background, the existing Headline 
Goal is below level. (And the Battlegroups no 
more than a detail – at most a useful first-entry 
unit for a larger force).   
 
Also, let us not forget that not that long ago, 
European countries deployed over 100,000 
troops on crisis management operations 
conducted in the context of NATO, the EU, 
the UN, ad hoc coalitions and/or national 
operations.  One must indeed note that the 
total number of men and women in uniform 
has gone down. Hence, in the future, if we 
want to generate that same level of effort and 
even go beyond that level,  we will only be able 
to so if most – and preferably all – of the 27 
Member States cooperate in a very permanent 
and a very structured way, on capabilities, on 
interoperability and on effectively deploying 
together. And on doing so together with our 
partners, such as notably the UK. This is 
reasonable, doable, and more than 
commendable.   
 
Second, we need to set up a genuine HQ, for 
non-executive and for executive EU operations 
alike. If you have the ambition to launch crisis 
management operations, you need a dedicated 
HQ, a permanent one, and a “full OPS” one, 
not only for preventive actions, but for all  
scenarios one can imagine. That simple military 
logic is applied worldwide, in each country, 
alliance or organisation dealing with 
operations, with but one notorious exception:  
the EU. Let‟s no longer be too timid.  
 
Last but not least we ought to launch PESCO.  
Of the essence is to ensure that it is fit for 
purpose. The “Do‟s and Don‟ts” to that end 
are quintuple.  
 
ON AMBITION AND INCLUSIVENESS 
PESCO has to live up to its declared ambition: 
politically, militarily, operationally, financially 
and industrially. The motto should be: as 
inclusive as possible and as ambitious as the 
EUGS – with the emphasis on ambition. The 
necessary solidarity among participating 
Member States to live up to the obligations of 
PESCO cannot be put into question. Up to 
each Member State to choose whether it wants 
to join – and thus commit.  
 
Of course, it is important for each capability 
programme to reach the required critical mass 
of participating countries. But that can also be 
done by cooperating with countries that have 
not joined PESCO. This should leave us 
sufficient space to have a constructive debate 
on the most apt degree of inclusivity of 
PESCO.  
 
ON INDUSTRY  
It is not up to industry to select projects and 
programmes for military weapon systems and, 
subsequently, to absorb the financial incentives 
offered by the Commission. Henceforth EU 
funds are involved – meaning financial means 
provided by all 27 Member States. This implies 
we ought to act very, very cautiously. If ever 
there are signs that EU money is being spent 
simply to please some industries by selecting 
programmes that are not in line with CSDP 
requirements, PESCO is in danger of sudden 
death. At all times the focus has to be on the 
priorities that have been collectively identified 
within the CSDP structures.    
 
ON CAPABILITIES  
Capabilities must be integrated to the extent 
possible. Integration is not restricted to 
common procurement: we need common 
programme management from cradle to grave, 
with common logistics, common updates to 
preferably preserve a single common 
configuration, and even common doctrines, 
training and exercising. Capabilities exist to be 
deployed when and where necessary. PESCO 
is to facilitate common deployments. That is one 
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of its most essential objectives, while fully 
respecting the sovereign decision-making by 
Member States on taking part in military 
operations.   
 
ON OPERATIONS  
PESCO should make an end to the famous 
saying, about EU force generation conferences, 
that goes as follows: never before in the history 
of the European Union, have so few countries 
had to do so much in the name of so many. For 
perpetuating this condition is not only lethal to 
PESCO, but to the Union as such.  
 
A NEW MIND SET AT ALL LEVELS  
 
To make all of this happen, to arrive at tangible 
results on capability development and on joint 
deployments, we have to have all stakeholders 
on board. Heads of State and Government is 
not good enough. We need to have the MODs, 
the CHODs, the Armament directors and many 
others. Also a series of bureaucratic circles, for 
we need to inject a new-mind set. To do so, it is 
advisable to start at the top. Perhaps the EU 
monetary union may inspire us. We could for 
instance propose to the MODs to elect a kind of 
permanent chairman of informal PESCO 
meetings.  
 
 
CONCLUSION: L’ARGENT, LE NERF 
D’UNE PAIX DURABLE  
 
The conclusion can be very brief. Without 
proper funding, whatever percentage of GDP 
this will entail, PESCO and for that matter 
European Defence as well will remain a 
hallucination. It has become very clear that 
Europe can no longer afford the cost of a 
neglected defence, for it is very high indeed – 
and it does not help our sovereignty.  
 
In the end PESCO is about 100% national 
sovereignty coupled with 100 % European 
solidarity. You can‟t have the one without the 
other. And that goes for smaller and bigger 
member states alike.  
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